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Background: Public hospitals hold a key role in providing health care services especially to individuals
without health insurance, those who are partially covered by health insurance, and low income population.
However, some of these hospitals have converted to private status. The objective of this study was to
assess the effect of the ownership conversion of public hospitals into private status on the provision of
high-technology health services.
Methods: This study used a non-experimental longitudinal design based on merged secondary data from
the American Hospital Association annual survey, the Area Health Resources File, and the Local Area
Unemployment Statistics [1997–2013]. The dependent variable “high-technology health services” was
measured using Saidin index. There were 492 non-federal acute care public hospitals (n=8,335 hospital-year
observations) in our sample, of which 104 (21%) converted to private status (75 converted to private
not-for-profit and 29 converted to for-profit hospitals). The independent variable “privatization” referred
to ownership conversion from public to either private not-for-profit or private for-profit status. We ran two
fixed-effects linear regressions to measure the impact of privatization on high-technology services offering.
Results: Our key findings suggested that privatization was associated with a decrease in Saidin index
(β=−0.74; P=0.016; 95% CI: −1.34 to −1.38). For-profit privatization was associated with a greater decrease
in Saidin index (β=−1.29; P=0.024; 95% CI: −2.41 to −0.17), compared with an insignificant decrease for
not-for-profit privatization (β=−0.56; P=0.106; 95% CI: −1.25 to 0.12).
Conclusions: Given the excessive cost of high-technology health services and the change in the hospitals’
mission after privatization, privatized hospitals tend to reduce the number of high-technology health services
they provide.
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Introduction
Public hospitals are the main responsible for the delivery
of health care services to everyone, regardless of ability
to pay or health insurance status (1). In addition, public
hospitals are expected to provide medical and allied
health educations, engage in research, and administer
highly specialized services regardless of profitability (2-4).
However, the number of public hospitals in the United
States has declined from 1,778 hospitals in 1980 to 956
hospitals in 2018 (46% decline) (5,6). One underlying
cause of this decline is financial crisis, which can result
in closures or privatizations of public hospitals (1,7). For
instance, roughly 147 public hospitals converted to private
status between 1997 and 2009; 80% (117 hospitals) became
private not-for profit (NFP) and 20% [30] became private
for-profit (FP) hospitals (7).
For the purpose of this study, privatization indicates
hospital change of ownership from public to either NFP or
FP status. It has been one of the strategic moves chosen by
government entities that own public hospitals experiencing
financial difficulties or in need of some financial stability
(7,8). Previous research has demonstrated that privatization
may result in improved financial performance (2,9-12),
efficiency (2,13,14), and productivity (14). However, other
studies have indicated that privatization may lead to a
decline in health care quality (10,15,16) and a reduction
in access to care (2,16). The improvement in financial
performance and efficiency, after privatization, may
adversely impact health care quality (10) as well as the
provision of uncompensated care (11,17).
Changes in management and hospital mission, after
privatization, may also offer an opportunity to overhaul
service provision. This may include the provision of
high-technology health services or clinical services that
are “designed to solve certain human health problems,
to improve human health conditions, or to improve the
precision of diagnosis” [p13 in (18)]. These services may
include specialized services, such as organ transplantation,
burn care, fertility, medical/surgical/neonatal intensive
care, cardiac, emergency department, cancer, neurological,
and HIV-AIDS services. They also include services that
require a certain level of technological innovation, such
as virtual colonoscopy, shaped beam radiation system,
and extracorporeal shock wave lithotripsy. Both the initial
capital investment and operational cost for high-technology
services can be very high and have been identified as major
contributors to the escalating health care costs (19,20).
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However, high-technology services can also contribute to
health care improvement, such as more accurate diagnostics,
minimally invasive procedures, increased use of outpatient
services versus inpatient hospital stay, shorter hospital stay,
better health outcomes, and increased longevity (20).
Relatively few studies have explored the impact that
privatization may have on the provision of high-tech services.
Prior studies have found that privatized hospitals tended to
terminate services that are essential but deemed unlucrative,
such as trauma center (2,9), alcoholism and drug abuse
therapeutic services, and HIV-AIDS services (2). However,
these studies tended to explore the impact of privatization
on a limited number of high-tech services. Furthermore, one
study focused on privatization of public hospitals to NFP
status in only three states (2) and the other study was limited
to privatization data through 1998 (9).
The purpose of this study is to build on prior studies
by assessing the change in the overall provision of hightechnology medical services following privatization using
longitudinal data from 1997–2013. Furthermore, the study
uses the Saidin-index, which is a comprehensive measure
of the high-technology services provided by each hospital.
The measures of high-technology services included in
the Saidin-index are based on previous literature that has
identified these services as indicators of hospitals’ hightechnology capability (21-23). Finally, the study examines
whether the provision of high-technology medical services
differs between NFP and FP privatizations.
Conceptual framework
This study applied the agency and property rights
theories. Both theories have been used to examine hospital
performance after privatization (14,24). These theories
explain managerial behavior based on the organization’s
ownership type. Public hospitals in the United States
(U.S.) are the possessions of the citizens of a state, county,
or city, who are represented by the federal, state, or
local government and as such they directly or indirectly
operate under the control of elected officials (25).
Public hospitals generate financial capital from public
funding in the form of tax revenues as well as tax-exempt
bonds (26). Given that public hospitals receive funding from
the public, their principal purpose is to meet the needs of the
public by providing health care and delivering specialized
services to all patients regardless of financial or health
insurance status. For instance, 108 public hospitals members
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of America’s Essential Hospitals, which account for roughly
2% of all US community hospitals, provided 18% of all
uncompensated care of the nation ($7.8 billion) in 2014 (27).
While all hospital types are expected to maintain a viable
financial profile, public hospitals tend not to focus on making
profit only and are more likely to provide specialized services,
regardless of profitability, compared with private hospitals (3).
In addition, profits gained by public hospitals are usually
deposited in the public treasury and not distributed among
the owners and managers (25).
Private not-for-profit (NFP) hospitals are tax-exempt
charities as determined by section 501 (c) (3) of the U.S.
Internal Revenue Code. They are owned by faith-based or
other secular organizations. Given their tax-exempt status,
the NFP hospitals’ mission is to provide high-quality
health care, medical education, and research with a nonprofit seeking motive (28). These hospitals are required
to provide both compensated and uncompensated care
on condition that it does not jeopardize their financial
stability (29). NFP hospitals raise their capital from
philanthropists’ donations and tax-exempt bonds. Yet,
giving donations does not guarantee the donors the right
to receive excess revenues over costs, which are required to
be reinvested in the hospital. In addition, the funds from
the sale of the hospital cannot be given to philanthropists;
they are invested in a foundation for the good of the
community (28,30,31).
In contrast to NFP, for-profit (FP) hospitals are owned by
investors and their primary goal is to grow investors’ wealth.
Taking into consideration their profit-seeking motive, FP
hospitals are not exempt from property, sales, and income tax,
and they are not required by law to deliver uncompensated
care. Not like public and NFP hospitals, FP hospitals’
shareholders are legally entitled to receive dividend and
financial gain on hospital sale among themselves (28,30,31).
Agency theory explains the conflict regarding the
relationship between the principal (the owner of the
organization) and the agent (the manager or management
team), who is hired by the principal to manage the
organization. Agency theory suggests that the principal
and the agent have diverging plans and objectives. The
inability to converge the plans and objectives of the agent
with those of the principal may result in poor organizational
performance. The agent’s major agenda is to achieve his
or her own objectives even at the expense of the principal’s
objectives (24,32), and it can be challenging and pricey
for the principal to oversee the agent’s behavior (33).
According to agency theory, and in the case of private firms,

the principal can offer some financial incentives to the
agent for his or her commitment to the principal’s agenda.
Managers of profit maximizing private firms are rewarded
in term of co-ownership through stock options as they
engage in strategies that improve financial performance.
Managers of private not-for-profit organizations may
receive some financial incentives at the discretion of the
Board of Directors or “Compensation Committee”, in
terms of bonus, increase in annual compensation, and
threat of executive turnover (34,35). Public organizations,
in contrast, are constrained in their ability to use financial
incentives to reward management performance. Decisions
regarding compensations of public hospitals’ managers are
made at public meetings (36). The citizens, who are the
major stakeholders of public hospitals, may be reluctant to
offer generous financial compensation to managers (36).
Furthermore, the relationship between the principal
and the agent of public organizations is mediated by
politicians, resulting in two principal-agency relationships:
the relationship between the public, who is the owner (as
principal) and the politicians (as agents) and the relationship
between the politicians (representing the public) and the
managers (as agents) (32). Politicians are powerful entities
who can impose their agenda, which might facilitate their
re-election, but might negatively impact performance
(13,24,32). Politicians, on the other hand, do not have
power to directly interfere in management practices of
privately-owned organizations. Thus, the principals of
private organizations are better able to align their interests
and objectives with those of the agent than the principals
of public organizations. Since privatization is a turn-around
strategy, privatized hospitals can freely implement drastic
cost reduction strategies, which may include the cessation of
some high-technology services. Therefore, based on agency
theory, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1: Public hospitals reduce the number of hightechnology health services following privatization.
Property rights theory (PRT) suggests that giving
managers the right to make decisions regarding the use of an
asset as well as ownership of the residual income is the most
effective incentive for managers to make profit-maximizing
decisions, which consequently increases managers’
financial compensation (37,38). Private FP hospitals are
profit maximizers; their primary goal is to satisfy their
shareholders. Shareholders are allowed to distribute residual
income among themselves and managers, as well as sell their
shares to other investors if they do not get the highest rate
of return on their investments (24,38). Therefore, managers
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will do their best to satisfy investors by maximizing their
wealth. Managers may implement cost reduction strategies
such as discontinuing expensive and/or unprofitable hightechnology services to increase profit. Unlike private FP
hospitals, private NFP hospitals are utility maximizers.
Given their tax-exempt status, private NFP hospitals are
expected to meet the needs of the community. A study of
the Congressional Budget Office found that NFP hospitals
are more likely to provide unprofitable specialized services
such as emergency room care and labor and delivery services
compared with FP hospitals (29). Also, NFP hospitals
are not permitted to allocate residual income among the
donors, the board of directors, or the managers (24).
Therefore, the managers of NFP hospitals are not as
motivated as the managers of FP hospitals with respect to
profit maximization. While the Chief Executive Officers
of NFP hospitals are not given ownership right to the
hospitals, based on financial performance, they may receive
compensation based on the levels of high-technology
services provided by the hospital (39). Consequently, the
managers of NFP hospitals may not be as motivated as the
managers of FP hospitals to aggressively cut costs by closing
expensive and/or unprofitable high-technology services.
Thus, according to PRT, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2: Public hospitals privatized to FP status will have
a larger decrease in high-technology health services level compared
with hospitals privatized to NFP status.
Methods
Data
Our study combined three publicly available secondary
data from: (I) the American Hospital Association (AHA)
Annual Survey, (II) the Area Health Resources File (AHRF),
and (III) the Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS)
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The AHA data file
contains hospital profile variables such as ownership status,
the number of hospital beds, teaching status, multihospital
system affiliation, the size of the health care workforce, and
the list of services provided by each hospital. The AHRF
data file contains county-level demographic, health care
workforce, and economic data. The LAUS data file provides
unemployment rates for metropolitan areas, cities, and
counties (monthly and annual estimates). The AHA data
are the mostly used data for studies of US hospitals and the
AHRF data are the mostly used data with respect to countylevel variables. The LAUS has the complete unemployment
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rate data at the county level.
Sample
Our sample was comprised of all publicly owned, nonfederal, community hospitals in the U.S. These hospitals
were tracked each year from 1997 to 2013. Data after 2013
were not included in our study years due to the major
changes in the US healthcare system after 2013. The full
implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), signed
into law 2010, was in 2014. Some provisions of the ACA
to improve access and quality of care while enhancing
efficiency (as seen in Hospital value-based purchasing
programs) may affect the provision of high-technology
health care services. In the same vein, the Medicare Access
and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA), signed into law
in 2015 and implemented in 2017, which involves some
fundamental changes in physician reimbursement from
treating Medicare patients may also affect the provision of
high-technology services. Also adding more years to our
study period of 17 years will lead to additional attrition of
hospitals and result in smaller sample size. As we add more
years to the data, the number of hospitals that have missing
data, with respect to the dependent variable, increases
and they need to be dropped from the sample. Our initial
sample contained 1,247 public hospitals. To build our study
sample, we excluded the following hospital types: hospitals
that converted to a skilled nursing (n=4) or an ambulatory
care organization (n=1); critical access hospitals (n=578)
because they have a special Medicare reimbursement rate at
101% of reasonable costs and they are not subject to both
Inpatient and Outpatient Prospective Payment Systems (40);
hospitals that experienced a merger or an acquisition
(n=8); hospitals with incomplete data, with respect to the
dependent variable, throughout the study period (n=85);
hospitals that underwent several changes in ownership
status (n=32); and hospitals that closed (n=47). The final
study sample included 492 public hospitals (8,335 hospitalyear observations).
Measures
Dependent variable
The number of high-technology services owned by a hospital
was measured using a high-technology index “the Saidin
index”, which was a continuous variable and consisted of
the sum of the weighted binary variables from the AHA
survey on facilities and services that indicated the presence
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or absence of a particular high-technology service in a
particular hospital (23,41). In the Saidin index, the number
of services increased as new technologies become available
and as these technologies were added to the AHA survey. For
instance, the number of high-technology services increased
from 53 in 2005 to 68 in 2010 as new technologies such as
simulated rehabilitation environment, endoscopic retrograde
cholangiopancreatography, and assistive technology centers
were added (see Table S1). The weights indicated the rareness
of a particular high-technology service and were calculated
by finding the proportion of hospitals that did not possess the
high-technology service (42). For instance, a weight of 0.97
in 2010 for a robot-assisted walking therapy indicates that
97 percent of the U.S. hospitals did not have this particular
high-technology service in 2010; only 3% of all US hospitals
provided robot-assisted walking therapy. In the denominator
of the Saidin index weight calculations, all US hospitals were
included because a high-technology service was rare if only a
few hospitals provided that service. Thus, higher Saidin index
scores indicated the use of high-tech services with a higher
degree of rareness (23).
Variable “count index” was used as the dependent
variable in a sensitivity analysis. Count index consisted of
the total number of all high-tech services provided by a
hospital in a particular year. It was a binary variable coded
as “1” if the hospital provided the service in a particular year
and coded as “0” if the hospital did not.
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mix, occupancy rate, Medicare mix, Medicaid mix,
multihospital system membership, participation in a health
network, and contract management (12,14).
Environmental variables (county level) included
the following: per capita income, unemployment rate,
percentage of people who were ≥65-year-old, number of
active physicians per 1,000 population, yearly change in
the unemployment rate, Medicare Advantage penetration,
excess capacity. In addition, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
measured at the Health Service Area (HSA) level was
included as a control variable (12,14). Table 1 summarizes
the operational definitions of the variables (14).
Statistical analysis

Control variables
This study included organizational and environmental
variables that may influence the use of high-technology
medical services as control variables (44,45). Organizational
variables included: hospital size, teaching status, outpatient

Our study used a non-experimental longitudinal design
using 1997–2013 data. Cross-tabulations and ANOVAs
were used to describe the data, followed by hospital and
year fixed-effects linear regression models. A fixed-effects
(FE) model controlled for unobservable variables that
remain unchanged over time but may be associated with
the independent variables and may contribute to betweenhospitals variations. As such, a FE model measures withinhospital variations regarding the provision of hightechnology medical services. Failing to do so may bias the
results due to omitted variables (12,14,46,47). We modeled
the FE linear regressions as follow (14):
(I)
Hypothesis 1:
Yit= β0+ β1* Privateit + β2*Controlit + β3*Yeardummy + µit
(II) Hypothesis 2:
Yit = β 0 + β 1* Privateprofit it + β 2* Privatenoprofit it +
β3*Controlit + β4*Yeardummy + µit (Hypothesis 2)
Where:
 Y: dependent variable;
 β0: intercept;
 Private: conversion from public to private status;
 Privateprofit: conversion from public to for-profit
status;
 Privatenoprofit: conversion from public to not-forprofit status;
 Control: control variables (organizational and
market characteristics);
 Yeardummy: year dummy variables;
 i: individual hospital;
 t: each individual year;
 µ: error term.
Our dependent variables Saidin index and count index
(for sensitivity analysis) were both approximately normal,
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Independent variables
For Hypothesis 1, privatization was a binary variable
recoded as “1” if the hospital converted to private status
(the year of privatization and following years were recoded
as 1) and “0” if the hospital remained public (12,14). For
Hypothesis 2, privatization had two dummy variables. The
dummy variable “privatization to for-profit status” was
recoded as “1” if the hospital converted to private for-profit
(the year of privatization and following years were recoded
as “1”) and “0” if the hospital stayed public. The other
dummy variable “privatization to not-for-profit status” was
recoded as “1” if the hospital converted to private not-forprofit (the year of privatization and subsequent years were
coded as “1”) and “0” if the hospital stayed public (12,14,43).
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Table 1 List of variables and operational definitions (14)
Measures

Operational definition

Data source

Dependent variable
High-technology health services

Saidin index (index of all the high-technology services provided by
the hospital)

AHA

Independent variables
Privatization from public to private status

Hypothesis 1—dichotomous: privatization =1, no privatization =0

Privatization from public to either private
for-profit or private not-for-profit status

Hypothesis 2—dichotomous: privatization to FP =1, no privatization
to FP =0; dichotomous: privatization to NFP =1, no privatization to
NFP =0

AHA

Hospital beds

Total number of beds in the hospital

AHA

Teaching status

Dichotomous: having teaching activities =1, no teaching activities =0

AHA

Outpatient mix

1 − (total inpatient days/adjusted inpatient days)

AHA

Occupancy rate

Total inpatient days/(# beds ×365 days)

AHA

Percent Medicare inpatient days

Medicare inpatient days/total inpatient days

AHA

Percent Medicaid inpatient days

Medicaid inpatient days/total inpatient days

AHA

System membership

Dichotomous: system member hospital =1, stand-alone hospital =0

AHA

Health network

Dichotomous: health network membership =1, not health network
membership =0

AHA

Contract management

Dichotomous: under contract management =1, not under contract
management =0

AHA

Control variables: organizational factors

Control variables: market factors
Per capita income

Total income in county/total number of residents

AHRF

Unemployment rate

Total number of unemployed/total number of people in the labor
force

LAUS

Total physicians per 1,000 population

(Total number of active physicians/total population) ×1,000

AHRF

Yearly change in unemployment rate

Change in unemployment rate from previous year to current year

LAUS

Percent population ≥65

Total number of people ≥65/total population in the county

AHRF

Medicare managed care penetration

(Medicare managed care enrollees/total Medicare eligible) ×100

AHRF

Excess capacity

Total number of unoccupied beds in the county/total number of
hospitals in the county

AHRF

Herfindahl Hirschman index (HHI)

Herfindahl index = Σ squared market share of all the hospitals in
the health service area. Market share for each hospital is measured
in term of total acute-care patient days for individual hospitals/the
total acute-care patient days in the health service area

AHRF/AHA

Table adapted from ref (14). AHA, American Hospital Association Annual Survey; AHRF, Area Health Resources Files; LAUS, Local Area
Unemployment Statistic.

based on skewness and kurtosis (48-50). None of our
independent variables had multicollinearity issues. To test
Hypothesis 2, the “lincom” command in STATA was used

after the regression analysis on the impact of privatization to
either NFP or FP status on high-technology services level.
“Lincom” stands for linear combination, this command
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asks STATA to compute the difference between the beta
coefficients of NP and NFP privatizations and assess
whether that difference is statistically significant. Software
SAS 9.2. and STATA 14 were used to clean and analyze the
data, respectively.
Results
One hundred and four hospitals (21%) privatized among
the 492 hospitals in our study sample. Seventy five hospitals
(72%) converted to NFP and 29 hospitals (28%) converted
to FP status among the 104 hospitals that privatized. With
regards to the 85 hospitals that did not have complete
data throughout the study period and were removed from
our study sample, 33% were affiliated with multihospital
systems, 14% were under contract management, 17%
were health network participants, and 19% were teaching
hospitals. On average, the number of beds was 166,
occupancy rate was 56%, and the Saidin index was 5.43.
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of our study
sample by type of privatization. The Saidin index before
FP privatization was the lowest (4.72) and the Saidin index
after NFP privatization was the highest (11.30). Hospitals
privatizing to NFP had the highest average number of
beds (199). They were also more likely to be built in
counties with the highest per capita income ($33,446)
as well as highest Medicare Advantage penetration
(16%). Hospitals privatizing to FP status had the highest
percentage of hospitals affiliated with multihospital systems
(71%) and highest Medicare mix (56%), but the lowest
percentage of teaching hospitals (13%), the lowest Medicaid
mix (18%), and the lowest occupancy rate (49%).
The results of the fixed-effects linear regressions are
summarized in Table 3. After controlling for organizational
and environmental factors, privatization was associated
with a decrease in Saidin index (β=−0.74; P=0.016; 95% CI:
−1.34 to −1.38). Therefore, hypothesis 1 was supported.
Hypothesis 2 was partially supported; privatization to
FP was associated with a greater decrease in Saidin index
(β=−1.29, P=0.024; 95% CI: −2.41 to −0.17) compared with
a non-significant decrease for privatization to NFP (β=−0.56;
P=0.106; 95% CI: −1.25 to 0.12). However, the results from
the lincom command showed that the difference in the
levels of high-technology services between FP and NFP
privatizations was not statistically significant (coefficient =
0.73; P=0.252; 95% CI: −0.52 to 1.99).
The results of the sensitivity analysis using count index
as the dependent variable were similar to the results using
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Saidin index. Privatization was associated with a significant
decrease in count index (β=−1.03; P=0.007; 95% CI: −1.78
to −0.285), but the effect size was greater with count index
than Saidin index. In the same vein, FP conversion was
associated with a larger reduction in count index (β=−1.72;
P=0.015; 95% CI: −3.11 to −0.34), compared with a smaller
and marginally significant decrease for NFP privatization
(β=−0.80; P=0.061; 95% CI: −1.64 to 0.04). However,
the results from the lincom command indicated that the
difference in the levels of high-technology services for
FP and NFP privatizations was not statistically significant
(coefficient =0.92; P=0.245; 95% CI: −0.63 to 2.47) (table
not shown).
With respect to the control variables, the results of
privatization from public to private status as well as
privatizations from public to NFP and from public to FP
status (Table 3) were quite similar. Thus, we report the
results of privatizations from public to NFP and from public
to FP status (hypothesis 2). Several organizational variables
were positively associated with Saidin index: hospital
beds (β=0.01; P≤0.001; 95% CI: 0.01 to 0.02), occupancy
rate (β=4.76; P≤0.001; 95% CI: 3.68 to 5.84), percent
Medicare inpatient days (β=2.94; P≤0.001; 95% CI: 1.77 to
4.107), and contract management (β=0.51; P=0.026; 95%
CI: 0.06 to 0.96). The variables outpatient mix (β=−4.00;
P≤0.001; 95% CI: −5.79 to −2.21) and multihospital system
membership (β=−1.38; P≤0.001; 95% CI: −1.73 to −1.02)
were negatively associated with Saidin index.
With respect to market variables, per capita income
(β=0.11; P≤0.001; 95% CI: 0.08 to 0.15) and unemployment
rate (β=0.33; P≤0.001; 95% CI: 0.25 to 0.40) were positively
associated with Saidin index. The variables number of
physicians per 1,000 population (β=−0.55; P≤0.001; 95%
CI: −0.86 to −0.24) , yearly change in unemployment rate
(β=−1.47; P≤0.001; 95% CI: −2.13 to −0.82), excess capacity
(β=−0.008; P=0.006; 95% CI: −0.01 to −0.002), and HHI
(β=−3.27; P≤0.001; 95% CI: −4.64 to −1.90) were negatively
associated with Saidin index.
Discussion
This study assessed the effect of the privatization of public
hospitals on the provision of high-technology health
services. It further explored whether privatization to FP
leads to a larger reduction in high-technology services
delivery relative to privatization to NFP. Based on the
agency theory and PRT theory and using the Saidin index to
measure the overall level of high-technology services offered
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Table 2 Cross-tabulations and analysis of variance (n=8,335)a (14)
Remained public

Public → FP

Public → NFP

P value

9.58

Before FP privatization, 4.72;
after FP privatization, 5.93

Before FP privatization, 6.36;
after FP privatization, 11.30

<0.001b

197

107

199

<0.001b

Yes

1,932 (25.94)

31 (12.55)

168 (26.21)

No

5,515 (74.06)

216 (87.45)

473 (73.79)

Outpatient mix

0.50

0.46

0.52

<0.001b

Occupancy rate

0.57

0.49

0.56

<0.001b

Percent Medicare inpatient days

0.45

0.56

0.51

<0.001b

Percent Medicaid inpatient days

0.24

0.18

0.20

<0.001b

Variable
Dependent variable, mean/frequency (%)
High-technology services index, Saidin
index
Control variables: organizational Factors
Hospital beds
Teaching status

<0.001b

<0.001b

System membership
Yes

1,802 (24.20)

176 (71.26)

363 (56.63)

No

5,645 (75.80)

71 (28.74)

278 (43.37)
<0.001b

Health network
Yes

1,746 (29.69)

35 (25.74)

247 (47.41)

No

4,139 (70.31)

101 (74.26)

274 (52.59)
0.042b

Contract management
Yes

1.052 (16.88)

14 (9.52)

81 (15.25)

No

5,181 (83.12)

133 (90.48)

450 (87.75)

29,243

31,362

33,446

<0.001b

Unemployment rate (%)

6.41

7.67

6.52

<0.001b

Percent population ≥65

13.70

15.48

13.82

<0.001b

Total physicians per 1,000 population

2

1

2

<0.001b

Yearly change in unemployment rate

0.04

0.04

0.05

0.605

Medicare advantage penetration (%)

12.07

12.77

16.38

<0.001b

60

54

59

0.047b

0.82

0.80

0.309

Control variables: market factors
Per capita income

Excess capacity
Herfindahl Hirschman index

0.79

a

b

, sample size and frequencies are expressed in hospital-year observations; , statistically significant at P≤0.05.

by each hospital, our key findings suggest that the level
of high-technology services is reduced after privatization.
This finding is supported by prior studies; privatized
hospitals discontinue or terminate some high-technology

services such as emergency rooms, trauma centers, intensive
care units, and cardiac services (2,9,51). Considering the
managerial flexibilities that private hospitals tend to have,
it may be easier for privatized hospitals to discontinue
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−

Privatization from public to NFP
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−3.92****
4.79****
2.90****
0.80

Outpatient mix

Occupancy rate

Percent Medicare inpatient days

Percent Medicaid inpatient days

0.55**

Contract management

Overall R-squared

242.29****

<0.001

<0.001

0.005

0.554

<0.001

<0.001

0.477

<0.001

<0.001

0.016

0.059

<0.001

0.209

<0.001

<0.001

<0.001

0.504

<0.001

−

−

0.016

P value

0.57

−4.64 to −1.90

−0.01 to −0.002

−0.01 to 0.03

−2.13 to −0.82

−0.86 to −0.25

−0.13 to 0.06

0.25 to 0.40

0.08 to 0.15

0.10 to 0.99

−0.01 to 0.66

−1.75 to −1.04

−0.45 to 2.06

1.73 to 4.07

3.72 to 5.82

−5.71 to −2.14

−0.36 to 0.73

0.01 to 0.02

−

−

−1.34 to −1.38

95% CI

0.70

0.003

0.01

0.33

0.16

0.05

0.04

0.02

0.23

0.17

0.18

0.64

0.59

0.55

0.91

0.28

0.001

−

−

0.31

SE

235.42****

−3.27****

−0.008***

0.01

−1.47****

−0.55****

−0.04

0.33****

0.11****

0.51**

0.33

−1.38****

0.78

2.94****

4.76****

−4.00****

0.18

0.01****

−0.56

−1.29**

−

β

<0.001

<0.001

0.006

0.569

<0.001

<0.001

0.461

<0.001

<0.001

0.026

0.059

<0.001

0.222

<0.001

<0.001

<0.001

0.515

<0.001

0.106

0.024

P value

0.57

−4.64 to −1.90

−0.01 to −0.002

−0.01 to 0.03

−2.13 to −0.82

−0.86 to −0.24

−0.13 to 0.06

0.25 to 0.40

0.08 to 0.15

0.06 to 0.96

−0.01 to 0.66

−1.73 to −1.02

−0.47 to 2.03

1.77 to 4.107

3.68 to 5.84

−5.79 to −2.21

−0.36 to 0.73

0.01 to 0.02

−1.25 to 0.12

−2.41 to −0.17

95% CI

0.70

0.003

0.01

0.33

0.16

0.05

0.04

0.02

0.23

0.17

0.18

0.64

0.60

0.55

0.91

0.28

0.001

0.35

0.57

−

SE

Saidin index from Public to NFP, from Public to NP: Hypothesis 2

, sample size is expressed in hospital-year observations. CI, confidence interval; SE, standard error. *P≤0.10, **P≤0.05, ***P≤0.01, ****P≤0.001.

a

Overall F-test

−3.27****

0.01

Medicare managed care penetration

Herfindahl-Hirschman index

−1.47****

Yearly change in unemployment rate

−0.008***

−0.55****

Total physicians per 1,000 population

Excess capacity

−0.03

0.33****

Unemployment rate

Percent population ≥65

0.11****

Per capita income

Control variables: environmental factors

0.33*

Health network

−1.39****

0.19

Teaching status

System membership

0.01****

Hospital beds

Control variables: organization factors

−

−0.74**

β

Saidin index from Public to Private: Hypothesis 1

Privatization from public to FP

Privatization from public to private

Independent variables

Variable

Table 3 Fixed effects linear regression models to test hypotheses 1a and 1b (n=8,335)a (14)
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expensive and/or unprofitable high-technology services
than for public hospitals. As providers of last resort, public
hospitals are more likely to provide the services needed
by the community including high-technology services.
For instance, 131 public hospitals affiliated with America’s
Essential Hospitals own 42% of all the U.S. burn care beds,
34% of level one trauma centers, and 25% of pediatric
intensive care beds (4). In addition, privatized hospitals may
have a greater independence choosing the kind of hightechnology services to provide than public hospitals.
Furthermore, our finding suggests that FP privatization
is more likely to be associated with a greater reduction
in high-technology services offering, compared with
a non-significant reduction after NFP privatization.
Since managers of FP hospitals face a greater pressure
to maximize profit than NFP hospitals and are better
compensated based on hospital’s financial performance than
managers of NFP hospitals, they may focus on closures
of some high-technology services based on financial gain,
patient mix, and physician staffing (51). Furthermore,
NFP hospitals may have greater pressures from medical
staff to keep high-technology services than FP hospitals.
Therefore, managers of NFP hospitals may be reluctant to
drastically reduce the high-technology services provided by
the hospitals (39).
We also found some associations between the control
variables and the Saidin index. Hospitals that increase
in size and experience growth in occupancy rate and
Medicare inpatient days are associated with increased
provision of high-technology services. Large hospitals
and those with higher occupancy rate may have excess
resources to invest in high-technology services and the
ability to generate economies of scale that allow them to
provide high-technology services. Similarly, hospitals that
experience growth in Medicare inpatient days are more
likely to experience revenue growth, which will allow
them to invest in high-tech services. Medicare patients
tend to have multiple comorbidities and severe medical
conditions. Therefore, hospitals may need to invest in
high-technology services to meet the needs of Medicare
patients.
Becoming affiliated with a multihospital system is
associated with a reduction in high-technology services.
Multihospital systems may have some restrictions in the
provision of high-technology services to ensure the financial
health of its members and the system. Multihospital systems
may also coordinate the provision of these services to
achieve economies of scale, especially if system hospitals are

in the same market.
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Managerial implications
While a reduction in high-technology services provision,
after privatization may be a good strategy to reduce
expenditures and improve the financial outlook of the
hospital, a thorough assessment of the choice of hightechnology services to discontinue is important. Such
choice should be based on the needs of the population and
the cost-effectiveness of the technologies to ensure that
patients have adequate access to the needed services without
causing financial stress to hospitals. Some technologies
may be highly advanced and costly, and yet the marginal
improvements in health care process and outcomes may be
minimal. Conversely, privatized hospitals may assess the
availability of high-technology services to the community
and decide to close those services that are already provided
by other facilities to avoid service duplication. This may
contribute to overall efficiency at the community level (52).
Also, involving physicians in decisions to cut hightechnology services is important since they are the key
providers. Outsourcing high-technology services to other
nearby facilities may also be a better alternative to closing
those services.
Policy implications
City, county, or state governments that plan to privatize
their public hospitals may need to conduct some
preliminary studies on provision of high-tech services,
after privatization, to ensure continuity of needed services,
without imposing a financial burden to the hospital.
Community health needs assessment coupled with costbenefit analysis and comparative effectiveness studies may
help all parties involved in deciding which high-technology
services to discontinue. A tight monitoring of public
hospital privatization is important to ensure continuity of
needed high-technology services.
Limitations
This study has some limitations with respect to the data.
First, our Saidin index measure failed to include the
availability of high-technology services in non-hospital
settings (such as imaging centers and hemodialysis clinics)
because the AHA data file only included high-technology
data among all hospitals. The inclusion of high-technology

Journal of Hospital Management and Health Policy, 2021

data from outpatient settings may improve Saidin index
value (23). Second, we were not able to assess whether
privatized hospitals referred their patients to other hospitals
or stand-alone clinics after they discontinued the service.
The elimination of some services may not dramatically
impact access if privatized hospitals outsource those services
to stand-alone specialty clinics or health centers. Third,
the results from this study are not generalizable to critical
access hospitals since they were excluded from this study.
Given the different Medicare reimbursement policy for
critical access hospitals, they need to be studied as separate
entities from non-critical access hospitals.
Fourth, we were not able to assess the availability of
high-technology services at the population level, after
privatization. Future studies are needed to investigate the
effect of public hospital privatization on the level of hightechnology services offered to the population. Finally, we
were not able to compare our findings with the findings
of comparable empirical studies using data from other
countries. Since privatization of public hospitals is a global
phenomenon, empirical studies assessing its impact on the
provision of high-tech services in other countries are greatly
encouraged.
Conclusions
The key findings from this study suggest that privatization
is associated with decreased use of high-technology services,
especially for FP conversion. Due to the prohibitive price
of high-technology services and the change in hospital’s
mission after privatization, privatizing hospitals tend to cut
the provision of high-technology health services.
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Supplementary
Table S1 High-tech services and Saidin index weights for select years
High-tech Services

1997

2000

Lung transplant

2005

2010

2014

99%

99%

99%

98%

98%

Proton beam therapy
Liver transplant

98%

98%

98%

Heart transplant

98%

98%

98%

Pediatric cardiac surgery -

97%

97%

97%

97%

97%

97%

96%

97%

97%

Robot-assisted walking therapy

97%

97%

Pediatric cardiac electrophysiology

97%

97%

Burn care

97%

98%

Pediatric diagnostic catheterization

Bone Marrow transplant services

97%

97%

97%

Kidney transplant

97%

96%

97%

97%

96%

Intraoperative magnetic resonance imaging
Fertility Clinic

95%

96%

96%

Other Transplant

97%

96%

96%

Blood Donor Center

94%

95%

95%

Freestanding/Satellite Emergency Department

98%

95%

95%

Electron Beam Computed Tomography (EBCT)

95%

95%

95%

Tissue transplant

97%

95%

94%

93%

92%

93%

93%

94%

92%

92%

91%

90%

89%

89%

89%

Computer assisted orthopedic surgery

94%

90%

88%

Genetic testing/counseling

93%

90%

88%

89%

89%

88%

92%

88%

87%

89%

89%

87%

Stereotactic radiosurgery

90%

87%

86%

Shaped beam Radiation System

89%

87%

85%

85%

85%

84%

92%

86%

84%

88%

83%

81%

82%

83%

94%

86%

83%

86%

82%

Pediatric intensive care

93%

Other intensive care
Neonatal intermediate care

Other special care

90%

88%

90%

Virtual colonoscopy
Positron emission tomography (PET)

Neonatal intensive care

97%

87%

95%

87%

Positron emission tomography/CT (PET/CT)
Assistive technology center
HIV-AIDS services

72%

75%

Image-guided radiation therapy
Esophageal impedance study
Adult cardiac surgery

83%

82%

82%

Intensity-Modulated Radiation Therapy (IMRT)

87%

83%

82%

Ablation of Barrett's esophagus

85%

81%

Electrodiagnostic services

84%

80%

Ambulatory surgery center

81%

80%

Simulated rehabilitation environment

83%

80%

Cardiac intensive care

71%

74%

76%

79%

80%

Extracorporeal shock waved lithotripter (ESWL)

90%

86%

83%

80%

80%

96%

87%

80%

81%

78%

78%

77%

77%

79%

77%

75%

78%

74%

Robotic surgery
Adult cardiac electrophysiology
Hemodialysis

83%

Adult interventional cardiac catheterization
Endoscopic ultrasound
Certified trauma center

84%

77%

77%

75%

73%

Single photon emission computerized tomography (SPECT)

75%

74%

73%

72%

72%

73%

72%

71%

71%

69%

Adult diagnostic catheterization
Endoscopic retrograde cholangiopancreatography (ERCP)
Multi-slice spiral computed tomography 64 + slice

91%

71%

64%

Neurological services

67%

64%

64%

Chemotherapy

62%

62%

62%

66%

62%

63%

62%

61%

58%

59%

59%

Full-field digital mammography

90%

67%

58%

Multislice spiral computed tomography < 64 slice

64%

57%

58%

52%

53%

54%

58%

52%

Adult cardiology services
Cardiac Rehabilitation
Diagnostic radioisotope facility

Medical/surgical intensive care

56%

47%

55%

47%

Optical Colonoscopy
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)

66%

61%

57%

52%

51%

Breast cancer screening/mammograms

43%

42%

47%

48%

48%

51%

45%

41%

Airborne infection isolation room
Outpatient surgery

33%

33%

38%

39%

41%

Ultrasound

37%

36%

39%

39%

40%

Emergency Department

32%

31%

36%

37%

39%

Computed-tomography (CT) scanner

40%

37%

39%

38%

38%

Radiology therapeutic

81%

80%

20

22

53

68

68

6299

6044

6349

6334

6239

Number of high-tech services
Number of hospitals used to calculate the weights
The table was sorted by 2014 weights from highest to lowest.
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